TP:
Metaphysical idealism is the least parsimonious theory of reality.
INTERLOCUTOR:
But... its a species of monism... so its automatically more parsimonious than dualism.
TP:
It is pseudo-monism.... each mind that contributes to the collective dream world is a "miracle" within idealism, only solipsistic idealism would be a valid monism. Idealism is approaches infinitism as life approaches infinite quantities of minds.
INTERLOCUTOR:
But then why wouldn't physicalism have the same problem in terms of physical objects? Wouldn't that reasoning count against physicalism too?
To be clear, I see the ontologies of idealism and physicalism as isomorphic except for their construal of what objects are. Physicalists think they're physical through and through, and they can't explain mind. Idealists think they are mind, but they (IMHO) cannot explain why physical objects seem so different from mental ones (rocks vs. thoughts).
If that's true, then physicalism has the same problem, no?
TP:
No, because materials are metaphysically fungible. It isn't one million miracles to have a million copies of the same thing, its just one big miracle. Unless the idealist thinks there is some sort of a mind-manufacturer and all minds are as fungible as materials, then they are on very different grounds of parsimony.
INTERLOCUTOR:
That's a good point but if you say there's a world spirit or something, couldn't you just say that all the other minds are really just aspects or proper parts of the one big mind? Doesn't that restore the symmetry?
TP:
That's a great question, I think that digs deeper into the calculation of parsimony. At the meta-level, I think physicalism would have a parsimony problem with each law of physics. My understanding is that there is like a network of physical laws that work together, so each law would be a degree of complexity that reduces parsimony.
Similarly, "mind" is the outgrowth of many psychological laws, the psychology being the laws of physics for the mind. So the greater the complexity of the mind, the more psychological laws needed to produce it. Hence this meta-mind would be less parsimonious due to its macro complexity in requiring many psychological laws.
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