An explication of Sam Harris's philosophy within his book - "The Moral Landscape"
Part 4
<UNDER CONSTRUCTION>
If you haven't already, check out part 3 first:
So, as I said in part 1, for purposes of this review of the book, I will first address the soft proposition and then the hard proposition as formulated –
Soft Proposition - Meta-wellbeing is subjectively the best axiom to use as the foundation of morality
Hard Proposition - Meta-wellbeing is objectively the foundation of morality and can be measured by science.
HARD PROPOSITION - Meta-Wellbeing is Objective
There seems to be a debate within the philosophy of morality regarding the ontological status of moral “oughts” that won’t seem to go away. The two camps of opposing views could be classified in terms of moral realism vs moral anti-realism, or objective morality vs subjective morality.
Generally, moral realism (objective morality) submits that transcendent moral codes exist in some tangible way, like an element of nature, or an energy field that pervades the cosmos. No doubt Abrahamic religion has played a role in creating this bias to believe that morality is built into the structure of reality, since the God who created morality also created the cosmos.
Moral anti-realism (subjective morality), on the other hand, refutes the claim of moral realism, maintaining that there is no evidence of any tangible moral properties that can be measured by science. The moral anti-realist is biased to believe that all moral judgements come from the subjectivity of minds.
Sam Harris is manifestly quite frustrated by this cultural divide as he believes there are benefits to objective morality that the secular have abandoned, leaving the power of objective moral authority to the religious.
David Hume
When you dig down into the structure of moral “oughts” we find that moral anti-realism makes a lot of sense. As Hume’s guillotine illuminated, you can’t truly get an “ought” from an “is”. It “is” a fact that animals can suffer. But that fact alone doesn’t necessarily produce an “ought” against harming animals. The lion harms its prey because, from the subjective perspective of the lion, if it is hungry, then it ought to harm its prey. Hence, on the face of it, it seems like all moral “oughts” can be reduced to hypothetical imperatives based on the perspective of the creature making the decision.
Hypothetical Imperative: If you value “X” and “X” is doable -> Then do “X”
The problem with hypothetical imperatives is that they reduce to the subjective values of the agent making the decision. What if Hitler values genocide? Ought he commit genocide? This type of moral subjectivism invites moral relativism – the inability to criticize another’s moral judgements. For if there is no transcendent absolute morality, then moral disagreements are just differences of opinion. Who are we to say Hitler is wrong and we are right?
Sam Harris finds this type of moral relativism quite frustrating, since he wants to appeal to the objective nature of wellbeing to rebalance our moral intuitions. He documents his experience struggling with a moral relativist in his book –
Immanuel Kant
Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher in the 1700s, was very bothered by David Hume’s revelation that morality was as flimsy and arbitrary as an individual’s value system. He grew up with a Christian moral bias, which led him to value the power of a transcendent moral code. Realizing that Hume had uprooted the foundation of morality inviting moral relativism, Kant wanted to find a way to logically produce a solid morality that could be authoritatively applied to everyone. He puzzled himself over Hume’s moral skepticism for years before developing the categorical moral imperative, that unlike the hypothetical imperative, could be categorically applied to everyone.
In Kant's categorical imperative he states, "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law." Instead of appealing to hypothetical imperatives as Hume might do, Kant essentially appeals to the “moral law” written on people’s hearts that they would like to be applied in the world. Kant basically says that every person knows what moral laws they wish others would follow, so they have a duty to also follow those moral laws.
Perhaps within the mind of each person are written some social “oughts”. Perhaps we naturally have the intuition that other people ought not steal my property. This is an ought that comes from within our intuitions, yet we would like to apply this ought externally to those around us. But if we only apply this "ought" externally to others, and we do not apply this "ought" to ourselves, then we have violated our own morality.
Kant wants to say that these “oughts” should apply to all people axiomatically. By looking for “oughts” at the universal level, Kant avoids the biased selfish “oughts” at the level of the individual. Hitler may have some selfish hypothetical imperative to commit genocide because of his hate for Jews, but at the universal level, it is reasonable to assume that Hitler would not like another nation to commit genocide on the Germans. Hence, Hitler would have a categorical imperative to not commit genocide.
The same logic that Kant uses to justify his moral theory can be applied to Sam Harris's wellbeing moral theory. In fact, this system of justification works better for wellbeing than most principles. It may be the case that different individuals disagree on which moral laws they would like applied universally, but one thing is not debatable - that all people agree that their own wellbeing is important. Moral disagreement could be applied to issues like taxation, border enforcement, etc. But there is no disagreement about the desire for wellbeing. If all people value their own wellbeing, then, in order to not be hypocritical, they must also value the wellbeing of their fellow citizens. So, a theory of meta-wellbeing could easily be grounded within the framework of an uncontroversial categorical imperative.
This seems to help ground morality in a more universal way. But does the Kantian categorical imperative reach the level of objectivity or realism? To get to the bottom of this we will need to first explain our terms. Confusion over language is often the cause of much unproductive debate. Ideally, we want our definitions to be as clear as possible with measurable identifiers so that we can categorize our ideas accurately. Past philosophers have complained about the vagueness of language in the following ways -
“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language.” ― Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
“Nothing is more important for teaching us to understand the concepts we have than to construct fictitious ones.” ―Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value
“Modern objectivity mixes rather than integrates disparate components, which are historically and conceptually distinct…This layering accounts for the hopelessly but interestingly confused present usage of the term objectivity, which can be applied to everything from empirical reliability to procedural correctness to emotional detachment.” - Lorraine Daston, The Image of Objectivity
Terms Defined
First we must get a handle on what an "ought" is in the first place. An "ought" is similar to a "should". It can represents an moral obligation or duty. It can also mean something that is necessary or desirable. Philosophically, oughts can be deduced from meta-oughts. Given that we have a meta-ought, "I ought to X", and given that we have information about the "Y" way to perform X, then a conjunction can result in the conclusion, "I ought to perform Y in order than I may obtain X."
Objectivity is a tricky word since its meaning is slightly different in a variety of contexts. The general theme behind the word "objectivity" is a nature of reliable truth value. These are a few ways we can nuance the idea of objectivity into a variety of more specific natures. For the purpose of fully exploring all moral considerations surrounding moral realism and objectivity, I will be a bit loose in my usage of objectivity to help encompass as many of the possible angles of analysis as I can. Since we are discussing moral objectivity, the following elements of objectivity are meant to be applied to how we evaluate the truth value of moral theories.
In order for a moral theory to have reliable truth value (objectivity), many people insist that there must be a fundamentally authoritative "ought" that demands adherence to a moral theory. Because of Hume's guillotine, we know that we cannot derive an "ought" from an "is", so many people have given up on this fundamentally authoritative "ought" and become moral anti-realists. In order to overcome this issue within moral objectivity, a fundamentally authoritative "ought" must be discovered. I will be calling this aspect of objectivity "primordially prescriptive objectivity".
Primordially Prescriptive Objectivity
The word 'primordial' implies "existing from the beginning" or "fundamental". The word 'prescriptive' implies "giving rules" to others. Theoretically, moral truths can be primordially prescriptive, in that they have axiomatic commanding value over moral agents before any other considerations. Primordially prescriptive moral 'oughts' would be 'oughts' that come etched into the fabric of existence before any other moral considerations. Something like "we ought to exist" would be a necessary primordial 'ought' to justify any morality that emerges out of evolution. Something like "we ought to obey God" would be a necessary primordial 'ought' to justify any morality that emerges out of theism. The problem with primordial 'oughts' is that anyone can assert a primordial 'ought', but that doesn't necessarily mean that the 'ought' actually exists. In order for some moral theory to have a primordially prescriptive 'ought', they must have some explanation for how this 'ought' exists. Moral anti-realists don't believe that primordially prescriptive oughts can exist and hence don't believe in this aspect of moral objectivity. Perhaps a theist might ground their primordially prescriptive ought as the moral laws that exists in the mind of God. Because God would be all powerful, he could magically apply his moral oughts to all creatures. But magic isn't that great of an argument.
In order for primordially prescriptive objectivity to exist, 1) a fundamental ought must be measurable, and 2) the ought's application to moral agents must be measurable (the connection).
De Facto Primordially Prescriptive Objectivity
The phrase "de facto" implies "in fact, or in effect, whether by right or not." Wikipedia further contextualizes "de facto" as "describes practices that exist in reality, whether or not they are officially recognized by laws or other formal norms." [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_facto] "De facto" implies rules, norms, expectations, habits, policies, standards, arrangements, and facts that exist in reality that aren't necessarily documented [10 Examples of De Facto - Simplicable - https://simplicable.com/new/de-facto ].
De facto morality is basically the morally that we naturally have without noticing why. So, the idea of "de facto primordially prescriptive objectivity" would imply the natural moral "oughts" that come from the beginning of time and emerge out of the structure of reality. If theists could prove that God existed and that he created the universe, perhaps they could appeal to "de facto primordially prescriptive objectivity" for their divine moral theory, because the facts of existence imply a divinely moral duty. There may be no primordial "thou shalt obey God" written into the fabric of space-time" but all creatures de facto function as if they ought to obey God since the pattern of existence de facto manifests that way. Similarly, if the pattern of evolution inevitably results in creatures who de facto value existence, then "we ought to exist" could be appealed to as a de facto primordially prescriptive ought. Again, there may be no cosmic rule that primordially insists that we "ought to exist" but this is the way 'being' manifests itself, regardless.
Another feature people like to attribute to moral objectivity is "absolutism". Absolutism implies that moral truths are universally valid across all situations. For purposes of being as fastidious and nuanced as possible I will be splitting the idea of absolute morality into two categories - absolute and cosmic. Within the fields of metaphysics and theology, a categorical distinction is made between "immanence" and "transcendence". That which is immanent is basically "within this universe", and that which is transcendent is basically "outside this universe". For our purposes, I will be using "cosmic objectivity" to refer to moral truths that are true within this universe (immanent), and "absolute objectivity" for moral truths that are truth both within and without this universe (both immanent and transcendent).
Absolute Objectivity
Absolute moral truths are true in the most absolute sense possible. They are true across every time and place. They are true in a way that is not dependent on material existence. They are a type of transcendental truth that exists even before the universe existed. Absolute moral truths are true across the multiverse, both within and without all possible worlds, and across all possible timeframes. Perhaps a God could say that "harming others is wrong in the most absolute sense" and we could interpret that as a moral truth that transcends our situation and is therefore wrong on earth, in heaven, in hell, and in any other possible situation across all time.
Cosmic Objectivity
Regardless from what point in space-time you travel to within the cosmos (even before the earth existed), cosmic moral truths should be equally applicable in all loci, as a fundamental mind-independently objective element of the cosmos. Cosmic objectivity would be limited to one universe. Cosmic objectivity can include divine objectivity, where a theist appeals to God as the foundation for morality. If moral truths are true from the birds-eye view of God or the universe, then we have cosmic objectivity.
Another common characteristic of objectivity is its existence in some physical form, usually as an emergent object build up from its constituent elements. And apple would be elementally objective because it is made up of physical materials. We could break apart the apple and measure the evidence of its material parts. If morality was elementally objective, given the right tools, we should be able to discover, handle, verify and measure its elements. For example, if moral truths were composed of spiritual energy particles, given the right type of microscope, we should be able to observe these particles in motion. We might be able to find patterns in their movements and perhaps detect how they are attracted to moral actions and repelled by immoral actions.
Absolute morality might transcend God himself - as a universe created by any possible god would have the same absolute moralities. Cosmic morality would be under the jurisdiction of one possible god and wouldn't need to apply to all possible universes.
Elementally Objectivity
Elementally objective facts are potentially measurable elements of the universe, whether in material form or energetic form. An elementally objective moral fact might entail some laws of physics that apply to moral particles or moral energy. Elementally objective moral facts are theoretically just as objective as elementally objective physical facts, such as electromagnetic facts.
One of the most important aspects of moral objectivity is its independence from specific stances or minds. Often the key area of disagreement between moral realists and anti-realists, stance-independent (or mind-independent) truths would theoretically allow a person to judge Hitler's actions as objectively wrong from this subject-independent standard of moral truth. Subjects are often differentiated from objects in the same way people are differentiated from inanimate physical objects. A subject has its own perspective and goal. An object is something indifferent to perspectives and goals. When we say mind-independent, we could say that we are looking for a truth that is independent of a subject's conscious perspectives and goals. When we say stance-independent, we could say that we are looking for a truth that is independent of a subject's unconscious perspectives and goals. The combination of these aspects, we can call subject-independence.
A key distinction to notice is the difference between subject-independent facts and subject-dependent measurement. In physical sciences, it is subject-independently true that "water is H2O." The truth of this fact is independent of any subject's mind or stance. Even if all sentient beings disappeared from the universe, this fact would still be objectively true. Despite the objective nature of this truth, this fact was derived by subject-dependent scientific investigation. Because scientists have their own subjectivity, minds with their own subjective interpretations had to use scientific instruments in order to measure and verify this objective truth. This truth only transcends the scientist's subjectivity by its ability to become true when measured by any and all subjects.
If a moral fact is able to be measured in the same way H2O might be measured then those measurements could be considered subject-independent, since any subject could verify them. But morality is much more complex than H2O. Morality might be more analogous to gravity. While there is a cosmic objectivity to the truth of gravity, the assessment of gravity can be reduced to the relationship between specific subjects or bodies of mass. For example, the gravitational relationship between the Earth and the Moon might be different than the relationship between the Sun and the Earth. So, even though there is theoretically a universal law of gravity that is stance-independent, there are stance-dependent measurements of gravity between celestial objects. Because these stance-dependent measurements do not rely on the opinions of the celestial bodies, we can still claim that these specific measurements are "subject-independent" since they were derived in an independent way (measuring device) and are found true when tested by any and all subjects.
Morality, like gravity, varies from situation to situation. In one situation, killing is bad, but in another situation where a life is in danger, killing may be good. Like gravity, morality is based on the context of the relationship between entities or subjects. But, perhaps, like gravity, morality is based on an objective set of moral laws that govern the calculations between subjects. If these objective moral laws could be found, then one might have grounds to claim that morality is subject-independently objective. This morality would need to have a means of measurement that could potentially be verified across any and all subjects.
Moral anti-realists often believe that there is no such thing as a moral law, so it is inevitably the case that all moral statements are merely opinions that come from the mind of subjects. But if the moral realist is able to produce evidence that all minds "gravitate" towards certain measurable moral conclusions, then perhaps they would have evidence of an objective moral law that operates over minds. The fact that these moral laws come from minds can be overridden by the fact that they can be verified across any and all subjects. Just as the subject-dependent measurement of gravity between the Earth and the Moon does not negate the subject-independent fact of gravity, the subject-dependent measurement of morality between two people should not negate the subject-independent fact of morality.
I believe this important distinction is often conflated in philosophic debates between moral realists and anti-realists. So for our purposes here, I will be highlighting the difference between subject-independence and subject-irrelevance.
Stance-Irrelevant Objectivity
Stance-irrelevant facts should be true without appealing to, referencing, or involving the perspective of any thing or subject.
The phrase "water is H2O" would meet this standard of objectivity since this fact is unrelated to the stance of any thing.
Gravity would fail this standard of objectivity since the assessment of gravity is relevant to the stance of each body of mass.
Artificial Intelligence game theoretic strategies would fail this standard of objectivity, since a strategy must appeal to the perspective of some AI controlled unit.
Mind-Irrelevant Objectivity
Mind-irrelevant facts should be true without appealing, referencing, or involving the perspective of any mind.
Gravity would meet this standard of objectivity since gravitation is based on the relationship between physical entities, not minds.
Artificial Intelligence game theoretic strategies would meet this standard of objectivity, since a strategy need not appeal to the perspective of some mind, as software does not have a mind.
Moral Naturalism would fail this standard of objectivity since the evolution of moral sentiments must appeal to minds and their properties.
Stance-Independent Objectivity
Stance-independent facts should be true across the entire set of some thing or some subject, verifiable against any and all perspectives. Gravity is an example of stance-independent objectivity. Theology is an example of the opposite - stance-dependent subjectivity. Meta-wellbeing-based morality would be an example of stance-independent objectivity, since the way the maximize wellbeing isn't based on one stance, but rather a birds-eye view stance. The facts of meta-wellbeing represent higher-order principles about the way wellbeing is generated that are true across all minds. Game theoretic morality would be an example of stance-independent objectivity, since the way to win the game isn't based on one stance, but rather a birds-eye view stance. The facts of game theory represent higher-order principles about the way strategies operate that are true across all stances. Cultural relativism would be an example of the opposite, a stance-dependent subjectivity where all cultures are equally correct.
Mind-Independent Objectivity
Mind-independent facts should be true across the entire set of minds, verifiable against any and all perspectives.
Meta-wellbeing-based morality would meet this standard of objectivity, since the way the maximize wellbeing isn't based on one mentality, but rather a birds-eye view mentality. The facts of meta-wellbeing represent higher-order principles about the way wellbeing is generated that are true across all minds. Any mind that accepts the principles of how meta-wellbeing is calculated should land on the same objective answer.
Game theoretic morality would meet this standard of objectivity, since the way to win the game isn't based on one mentality, but rather a birds-eye view mentality. The facts of game theory represent higher-order principles about the way strategies operate that are true across all minds. Any mind that accepts the principles of how game theory is calculated should land on the same objective answer.
Cultural relativism would be an example of the opposite, a mind-dependent subjectivity where all cultures are equally correct.
Emergent Objectivity
Moral facts only appear at specific times through processes that build and develop these facts, like the evolution of objective physical and behavioral structures (genes and game theory).
Measurable Objectivity
Moral facts are derivable via measurements.
Intersubjective Objectivity
Social constructs (like the value of currency) are socially agreed upon values that carry objective truth value despite resulting from intersubjective forces.
Rational-Deductive Objectivity
Moral facts are objective due to their derivability via pure a priori deductive reasoning. The fact that existence exists is self-evidently axiomatic. The fact that existence requires strategies (game theory) to exist is also self-evidently axiomatic.
Empirical-Evidence Objectivity
Moral facts can be objective through empirical verification via reliable sense perception.
Unbiased Objectivity
Just as a news anchor is being objective when they report without bias, moral theories can be objective when they are unbiased.
Statistically Rigorous Objectivity
A meta-analysis of the scientific landscape can allow each source of statistics to offset the errors and biases of each other to average out towards a more objectively accurate truth.
Post-Axiom Objectivity
The science of medicine is only an objective science once the subjective axiom "maximize health" has been established as its foundational axiom. Similarly, a science of wellbeing is only an objective science once the subjective axiom "maximize wellbeing" has been established as its scientific goal. Wellbeing morality can obtain post-axiom objectivity as long as the axiom of "maximize wellbeing" is accepted as its moral goal. Kant's categorical imperative can obtain post-axiom objectivity when the axiom "we ought to act in accordance with our internal moral law" is accepted. Similarly, a theistic morality might want to appeal to God's word as the foundation for their morality. Yet, God's word is not objective, but rather subjective - since God himself would be a rational thinking agent with his own divine subjectivity. Divine command theory morality can obtain post-axiom objectivity as long as the axiom of "God's commands are good" is accepted.
Objectivity Score Card
Now that we have our flavors of objectivity defined, we can begin to measure our moral theory against these standards.
Metaversal/Universal
From an absolute perspective, we have no evidence nor reason to believe that morality exists outside of the bounds of the universe (metaverse). From a cosmic perspective, we have no evidence nor reason to believe that morality exists equally at every point in space-time within our universe.
I believe Abrahamic theists usually operate on the idea that "objective morality" must be "absolute" or "cosmic" in nature, since Abrahamic morality is believed to be delivered by the voice of God. It seems to be assumed by them that God's dictates apply universally, independent of time and space. When discussing morality with Abrahamic theists, these distinctions should help clarify that the morality being discussed here is neither absolutely objective nor cosmically objective.
A key point for Abrahamic theists is for them to note that morality delivered by the voice of God seems more like a divine subjective morality rather than an absolute/cosmic objective morality. Euthyphro's dilemma helps highlight the fact that goodness isn't necessarily the same as the dictates of a god. Just because a god gives a command does not mean that command is good. Commands that come from the mind of a god come from divine subjectivity. Unless there is a mind-independent standard of goodness in the cosmos, a god's commands are just as reliable as a devil's commands.
Stance/Mind Independence
Most philosophers discuss moral realism at this level of analysis - whether or not morality is based on minds or positions. For the categorical imperative, it is clear that Kant is relying on the moral law written in our minds. Similarly, Sam Harris's meta-wellbeing relies on the moral imperatives in our minds to care about wellbeing. On these two counts, morality would seem to be subjective rather than objective. But, with moral game theoreticism, we find that we can breach the boundaries of subjectivity and become a mind-independent morality.
Just as within a game of chess, there are right and wrong choices independent of minds. We know that chess strategy is mind-independent because we can program soulless computer programs to play the game and make the correct moves. We can imagine a world full of philosophic zombies - the type of creature who look and function the same as a human, but they lack consciousness. Everything they do is programmatic and soulless. These philosophic zombies could evolve and respond to their environment in strategic ways, just like a chess program. Philosophic zombies that lacked cooperative programming would die off quicker that cooperative zombies. Essentially all of the rules of morality could be discovered by these philosophic zombies in a mind-independent way.
We could similarly construct a scenario where we populate a planet with soulless artificially intelligent robots. We could design these robots to have the ability to reproduce. Perhaps we give the robots a blueprint for constructing a 3d printer. Each robot makes it his life mission to construct the 3d printer and then print out some robot offspring. We could give these robots an imperative to survive and reproduce. We could also give them an imperative to insert a mutation module within their 3d printer that intentionally injects mutations into the next generation.
Under this robot planet scenario, we can imagine generations of robots working, reproducing, and populating the planet. We can imagine that evolutionary pressures might cause them to fight over resources - perhaps there isn't enough raw materials to print a next generation. We can imagine that different robots might evolve different strategies for dealing with their neighboring robot tribes. A type of morality could emerge out of these robots as they learn that cooperative strategies are more successful in the long run than violent strategies. They could be programming their children with more and more cooperative imperatives as time goes on.
From this robot thought experiment we can see that morality can emerge in a mind-independent way. There is no need to comprehend morality within a space of consciousness. Even within unconscious robots, a mind-independent morality still exists. Within the possibility space of potential strategies, many types of morality can exist. From a game theory perspective, all possible moralities are in the scope of morality. Even if the robots are not smart enough to evolve the best morality, given that we are smart enough - we could calculate the optimal morality for the robots. And if the robots evolved a harmful morality, we could judge that morality to be inferior.
[[[[
human body analogy of morality
from the perspective of different "cultures" of cells, it seems like their morality is relative - that which they "ought" to do is based on their culture and type.
But if we zoom out we see that they share an objective morality in that they ought to do the things that keep their organize surviving and thriving - since that is their de facto ought.
original primitive precursor version of something
]]]]
Best Game Theory
Under the “meta-ethics” section I outlined how I believe that all of morality falls under the umbrella of “game theory”. Morality varies across cultures, religions, and individuals in ways that can be evolutionarily expected. Evolution is a process of 1) introducing random mutations, and 2) testing the success of these mutations in the world. At the individual level, physical mutations can create better physical success. At the group level, moral mutations can create better social success. If the goal of morality is to find the best social strategy, then we can measure moralities based on how evolutionarily successful they are. Evolutionary success is a tricky thing to measure because it varies by timescale. The Fermi paradox highlights a potential propensity of intelligent civilizations to self-destruct. If a certain morality promotes self-destruction, then it is not evolutionarily successful. So, while a short-term analysis might say that religious morality is evolutionarily superior due to their large birthrates, large birthrates in the long run might be exactly what causes our species to self-destruct. Evolutionarily speaking, sustainability is a more superior social strategy than high birth rate.
Dobu Islands
While reading Sam’s book, I was simultaneously developing a theory about the evolution of morality. I was pondering on what factors motivate the evolution of cooperation and what factors inhibit its manifestation. I hypothesized that nigh infinite land and nigh infinite resources would motivate cooperative ethics. The large amount of land would mean that multiple populations would be competing. Violent nations would have lower population growth. Peaceful nations would have stronger population growth. Trade would be more productive than war. Hence, it doesn’t surprise me that cooperative ethics in Christianity and Buddhism evolved on the largest continent on earth. Yet, the inverse of this conclusion would be that cultures that evolved in finitely small and isolated territories with few resources would evolve a competitive zero-sum dog-eat-dog ethic. After formulating this hypothesis, I happened upon Sam Harris’s example of the Dobu islanders in his book. They originated on a 6 square mile island and evolved the most toxic religion you can imagine. A religion of hateful superstition, envy, cursing your neighbor, and doubting your family members became their norm. It seemed to fit that when resources were constrained, cooperation would lead to self-destructing population growth. Only with a religion of hatred were they able to reduce their population growth to sustainable levels. But just because they evolved a religion of hatred doesn’t mean that that is good. An ethic of meta-wellbeing allows us to measure religions based on how well they perform in maximizing wellbeing. The Dobu islanders found a sustainable strategy at the expense of wellbeing. Perhaps if the Dobu islanders were educated with a different morality, they could maintain wellbeing in tandem with stabilized population growth. Anyone would agree that all else being equal, the Dobu islanders would be better off with less hatred and more love.
Falsifiability
If we can find moral dilemmas where it seems like our collective moral intuitions are not congruent with meta-wellbeing, then perhaps we have found a way to falsify Sam’s hypothesis. Since meta-wellbeing is defined so broadly it will be tricky to falsify. I think that if our collective moral intuitions find that 1) we aren’t aiming for a better world, 2) we aren’t aiming for more physical wellbeing across more people, 3) we aren’t aiming for psychological wellbeing across more people, or 4) we aren’t aiming at a more far-sighted game theory, then perhaps we may have found a valid hole in his proposition.
Repudiation of Cosmic Morality
I think that Judeo-Christian thinking has corrupted the philosophic debate regarding morality. Western religion introduced us to the idea of cosmic morality. Theists are quick to claim that only by accepting God can you have a cosmic morality. They then conflate that cosmic morality with an objective morality. They are wrong in thinking that they have an objective morality, but they are right in believing that they have a cosmic morality. Secular minded people seem to also conflate these two. By admitting that there is no cosmic morality, secular people are further inclined to admit that there is no objective morality. If by objective morality, secular people mean moral rules encoded into the fabric of space-time, then yes there is no objective morality. But this is just conflating objective morality with cosmic morality. Objective morality is just something that can be measured and verified independently of the observers. If meta-wellbeing is the foundation of morality, then to the extent meta-wellbeing is measurable via neuroscience, it is objective.
Repudiation of Cosmic “Oughts”
The is-ought gap seems to trace its origin to the cosmic morality issue. If there is no cosmic morality, then there is no cosmic ought and no cosmic values. But why should we have ever expected these things in the first place? When we allow the cosmos to be the source of our morality, we end up without any “oughts” when we lose the cosmos. But it is clear that “oughts” and values come from our biology. Just because there is no cosmic imperative telling me to eat dinner doesn’t mean that I ought not eat dinner. We have a hierarchy of values built into our biology. In any situation, we ought to do that which we believe is the best thing to do with respect to our innate values. It is impossible for any other type of “ought” to exist. What this means is that the only “oughts” that can exist exist within our biology. The only values that can exist exist within our biology. And biology is scientifically measurable.
Criminality
Some people may naturally have a criminal value system. For a criminal, maximizing wellbeing might mean harming the wellbeing of others. This obviously violates the justice component of meta-wellbeing. Yet, even when a criminal wants to commit crime, if that is what he is biologically programmed to think he should do, then that is what he biologically ought to do. When a lion is programmed to eat a deer, that is what they ought to do. Morality is about doing the best decision that we can come up with. Rewards and punishments exist within societies to help guide people’s morality in more healthy directions. Education exists to help guide people’s morality in more healthy directions. Punishment can help the criminal realize that he ought not to commit crimes. Perhaps crime gives the criminal 10 units of wellbeing. But a punishment gives the criminal 11 units of suffering. Under this structure, the criminal ought to obey the law in order to maximize his personal wellbeing. It is the job of cooperating individuals to manage criminality. Criminality harms the wellbeing of the social system. Even if a lion ought to eat a human child, that doesn’t mean society must let the lion eat a human child. There are multiple levels of oughts. The predator’s ought is to cause harm. The social “ought” is to punish, restrict, and isolate individuals and animals with harmful values. By punishing those with harmful values, society makes those values less evolutionarily successful, allowing healthier values to propagate instead. If the criminal wants to be evolutionarily successful, they must prioritize the collective wellbeing over their own personal wellbeing. If everyone in society had criminal values, then maximization of meta-wellbeing would be to legalize crime. But societies that embrace harm are likely to be self-destructive. Meta-wellbeing is intimately connected to evolutionary survivability in that only those who care about meta-wellbeing succeed.
Foundation of Morality
We have already discussed how morality is based on game theory and how there is a hierarchy of strategies within game theory. The most successful strategy would be the most moral strategy, since evolution defines morality. If evolution is an objective science, and game theory is an objective study in the ways to play the game of evolution, then morality is an objective study of the best game theoretic strategies. We have found that meta-wellbeing is the most successful long-term strategy, and immoral strategies are those that aim for short-term benefits. When comparing moralities, we have already discovered that our moral intuitions guide us towards strategies that maximize meta-wellbeing instead of short-term benefits. This means that our source of morality is guiding us towards meta-wellbeing. If the source of our subjective morality is aimed at meta-wellbeing then meta-wellbeing is objectively the foundation of our morality.
Intersubjective Space
Each individual has their own subjective morality for what they ought to do built into their brains. When individuals work together, they create an inter-subjectivity where their subjective experiences intersect, and their moralities must cooperate. Inter-subjective space is a place where all of the complex values within individuals gather together to compete in a democratic fashion. It can be an objective fact that 40% of the population likes conservative values. It can be an objective fact that 60% of a population likes progressive values. These facts accumulate in this intersubjective space. Then the goal of maximizing meta-wellbeing involves prioritizing the values of the majority over that of the minority, to the extent they are incompatible. None of these facts are outside of the purview of science.
Science of Morality
If morality is a game theory, then we can objectively study it. Just like we can objectively study all the best ways to play the game of chess, we can likewise study the best ways to play the game of evolution. Violent strategies sacrifice the long-term for short-term benefits and are not sustainable. No doubt we will find that cooperative strategies are the best way for all of us to safely pass down our genes to the next generation.
Sentience
When we think about what matters in the universe, we naturally know that sentience is of sacred importance. That which can feel is sacred, because feelings are so powerful. A happy feeling is powerful because it feels like something that we are willing to do anything for. A painful feeling is powerful because it feels like something that we are willing to do anything to avoid. These powerful feelings make life a heaven or hell depending on the valence. We feel these feelings, so we know how good and bad they are. No one is worried about how a rock feels because no one believe that a rock has the ability to feel pain. In the end, morality must be based upon feelings, because nothing else in the universe matters. Whether or not Mars has a storm isn’t of moral importance. Whether or not Jupiter increases in temperature or not isn’t of moral importance. The only things that morally matter are how things impact the feelings of creatures.
Non-Wellbeing Morality
To the extent that the religions inject non-feeling-based rules into their morality, these rules have no moral significance other than their impact on the future feelings of the group. For example, an edict to cover your face with a cloth is not a moral injunction unless impacts wellbeing of someone. Perhaps covering your face reduces sexual temptation – a type of approach to wellbeing. Perhaps covering your face reduces sunburns – a type of approach to wellbeing. But the mere act of covering your face has no moral value in and of itself. If the covering of the face provides no benefit to one’s wellbeing, but it does harm one’s freedom, then it can be considered immoral in that it harms the freedom component of meta-wellbeing. Even religious attempts to base morality on rules that lead you into heaven and away from hell, the dichotomy between heaven and hell is also a desire to maximize meta-wellbeing which they propagate into an unknown post-death metaphysics. In the end, I am inclined to agree with Sam that it is impossible to coherently place morality outside of meta-wellbeing.
Conclusion
I find myself more convinced that meta-wellbeing is the best subjective axiom upon which to build our collective morality, that meta-wellbeing is in fact objectively the foundation of our morality, and that we will eventually be able to objectively measure answers to moral questions.
References:
Daston, L., & Galison, P. (1992). The Image of Objectivity. Representations, 40, 81–128. https://doi.org/10.2307/2928741
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